'Losing Iraq'

First Chapter
'Losing Iraq'
By DAVID L. PHILLIPS

George W. Bush did not imagine that preemption and nation-building would preoccupy his presidency. However, the 9/11 terror attacks gave Bush a defining mission. To defend the American homeland and U.S. global interests, the United States would retaliiate against failed states, such as Afghanistan, that provided sanctuary to al-Qaeda or other shadowy terrorist networks. It would also act preemptively, targeting rogue regimes to prevent them from developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which could be used against the United States or given to terror groups.

Having traveled overseas only a couple of times, it is clear that Bush lacked knowledge about international issues before he won the White House. His farthest trip away from home was to China, when his father was ambassador. During that visit, the younger Bush never left the embassy compound.

Bush's lack of international experience did not, however, make him an isolationist. During the 2000 campaign, he professed support for U.S. engagement in world affairs, insisting that "to build a proud tower of protectionism and isolation would invite challenges to our power."

George W. Bush embraces the use of U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military might to build a better world and to promote global freedom. Consistent with America's tradition and heritage, Bush maintains that the United States would never use its unparalleled military strength for national advantage. Speaking for the president, national security adviser Condoleezza Rice extolled the purity of America's mission: "We may be the only great power in history that prefers greatness to power and justice to glory."

Bush's global goals are consistent with those of his predecessors dating back to President Harry Truman. According to Truman, "It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation." To this end, Truman made a strategic decision that U.S. power could be effectively projected via international organizations. He sponsored the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe; NATO's (the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) creation in 1949 also affirmed the link between U.S. security interests and those of Western Europe. Regarding the means to achieve objectives, Truman's successors all affirmed the view that America's extensive overseas interests could best be defended through international organizations and alliances-until George W. Bush.

Bush differs from his predecessors, including his father, on the instrumentalities for exercising power. He is wary of working with international organizations lest those entanglements impede U.S. interests. He is prepared to engage multilaterally, but only on his terms. Bush believes that leadership means the courage to do what he thinks is right and in the national interest. Even if other countries object at first, Bush is convinced that they will eventually come around to the U.S. point of view.

Bush's antipathy towards internationalism and his willingness to go it alone stand in marked contrast to the views of President Bill Clinton, who championed globalization and relied extensively on a web of interconnected interests. However, Bush reflexively rejected Clinton's initiatives, accusing him of tainting America's image and squandering its prestige internationally.

Decrying the principle of humanitarian intervention, Bush and his advisers criticized Clinton's deployment of U.S. forces to Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and even Kosovo. Using troops for nation building was anathema. As Rice flatly stated, "The 82nd airborne should not escort kids to kindergarten." Bush was just as emphatic: "We should not send our troops to stop ethnic cleansing and genocide outside of our strategic interest. I don't like genocide and I don't like ethnic cleansing, but the president must set clear parameters as to where troops ought to be used and when they ought to be used."

During the first months of Bush's presidency, U.S. allies realized that Bush was serious about foregoing multilateral institutions and agreements. Though fifty-four countries ratified the Kyoto Protocol, Rice proclaimed that the climate-control treaty was "dead." The administration withdrew from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; balked at a new protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention; opposed a pact to control small-arms trafficking; and launched a determined and heavy-handed campaign to undermine the International Criminal Court.

But when it came to Iraq, Bush was initially content to continue his predecessor's policy of exerting pressure on Saddam Hussein through multilateral sanctions and support for groups in exile. Bush endorsed the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act, which allocated $97 million in U.S. government goods and services to support Iraqi oppositionists trying to overthrow Saddam. In 2001, Bush sought to strengthen the UN's role by replacing existing sanctions with so-called smart sanctions targeting dual use and military goods. Colin Powell stated, "We have kept [Saddam] contained, kept him in his box."

Though Bush's national security team focused on traditional threats and big power politics, Bush bore a personal grudge against Saddam. Indeed, Bush came into office with the idea of addressing unfinished business from the Gulf War and avenging Saddam's attempted assassination of his father in 1993. To George W. Bush, Saddam was more than a tyrant bent on developing weapons of mass destruction. He was the "guy that wanted to kill my dad."

If George W. Bush had ever been inclined to find false security behind America's borders, 9/11 changed all that. The terror strikes had a huge impact on Bush personally, as they did upon every American: The continental United States was attacked for the first time since the War of 1812. The American people felt an unprecedented sense of vulnerability.

Within a few days, the U.S. Congress unanimously gave Bush permission to use "all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001." Reflecting the international community's united support, France's Le Monde bore the headline, "We Are All Americans." A few days later, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1368, which condemned the attacks and authorized all necessary steps in response; NATO invoked Article 5, affirming that the attack on the United States represented an attack on the Alliance.

Bush concluded that the United States should aggressively prosecute a global war on terror and destroy its enemies. He warned, "We will not wait for the authors of mass murder to gain weapons of mass destruction. We must act now, because we must lift this dark threat from our age and save generations to come."

The 9/11 attacks also prompted a reevaluation of the overall U.S. security strategy that had existed since the beginning of the Cold War. Bush came to believe that

deterrence-the promise of massive retaliation against nations means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizen to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons or missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies. The war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the oath of action. And this nation will act.

The internation community grew increasingly alarmed by Bush's penchant for unilateral action. Fears were compounded by his moral invocations concerning the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. In jihadist vocabulary similar to Osama bin Laden's, Bush discarded nuance by dividing the world into good and evil. With deep conviction, he proclaimed that "our responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil." He also threatened: "We will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation in every region now has a decision to make. Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists." Bush pronounced U.S. intervention in Afghanistan a "crusade" and declared that "liberty is not America's gift to the world. Liberty is God's gift to every human being in the world."

The United States was at war, but it was not clear who the enemy was. The Defense Policy Board, a standing group of defense and national security experts that advises the secretary of defense, met in the Pentagon on September 19, 2001. The former Pentagon adviser Richard Perle was accompanied by Ahmad Chalabi, the leader of the Iraqi National Congress. Chalabi proceeded to make a strong argument for skipping Afghanistan and attacking Iraq. Though al-Qaeda was harbored by the Taliban in Afghanistan, Chalabi argued that Iraq was more threatening in a dangerous world where, according to the seventeenth-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, "Life is war of all against all."

Richard A. Clarke, Bush's antiterrorism chief, was amazed when, days after 9/11, Donald Rumsfeld broached the idea of bombing Iraq. Clarke pointed out that there was no evidence linking al-Qaeda and Iraq. According to Clarke, Rumsfeld complained about the poor selection of high-value targets in Afghanistan. "I don't want to put a million-dollar missile on a five-dollar tent." "No, no. Al-Qaeda is in Afghanistan," Clarke responded, "We need to bomb Afghanistan."

Bush instructed Clarke to find a link between Iraq and the al-Qaeda terrorist attacks. According to Clarke, "The president dragged me into a room with a couple of other people, shut the door, and said, 'I want you to find whether Iraq did this.' The entire conversation left me in absolutely no doubt that George Bush wanted me to come back with a report that said, 'Iraq did this.'"

Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill said that regime change in Iraq was on the agenda at Bush's first National Security Council meeting on January 30, 2001. Instead of focusing on Osama bin Laden and a strategy for securing and stabilizing Afghanistan, Bush and his advisers seized on 9/11 to make the case for overthrowing Saddam Hussein.

Bush insisted: "I'm tired of swatting flies. I'm tired of playing defense. I want to play offense. I want to take the fight to the terrorists." Re-calibrating America's approach to terrorism, Bush also wanted to send an unambiguous warning to countries that sponsor terrorism: "We want to cause them to change their views."

The administration saw Afghanistan as the first stage in an open-ended global war against terrorism. Bush wanted action. One week after the terrorist attacks, George J. Tenet, the CIA director, presented Bush with a "Worldwide Attack Matrix" detailing ongoing or planned covert antiterrorism activities in eighty countries. Anxieties were fueled by anthrax mailings. Americans felt a sense of imminent risk when it was reported that a "dirty bomb" had been smuggled into the United States.

After 9/11, the administration focused on failed states that provided haven to terrorists. The administration was also concerned about states that aided or provided safe harbor to terror groups such as Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, Yemen, and Sudan. In addition, U.S. troops were deployed and military assistance significantly expanded to weak states such as Georgia, Nepal, and in the Philippines. By the time President Bush delivered his "axis of evil" speech on January 29, 2002, the link between terrorist organizations and state sponsors of terrorism had become the cornerstone of the administration's national security strategy.

Bush addressed the nation: "States like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, constitute an axis of evil. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases the price of indifference would be catastrophic." Presaging the "Doctrine of Preemption," Bush fired a verbal shot at those who might conspire to harm the United States. "I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons."

The preference for unilateral action reflected a growing aversion to diplomacy, which is inherently about negotiation and compromise. Some senior officials disdained diplomacy and believed there should be no negotiation with states that support terror groups. They also argued that force is the only appropriate response to terrorist threats.

Administration hawks were mostly concerned about Iraq, which had defied sixteen UN Security Council resolutions demanding its disarmament. "The leader of Iraq is an evil man," he proclaimed in ratcheted-up rhetoric. "We are watching him carefully." Bush underscored the danger posed by terrorists possessing weapons of mass destruction, demanding that Saddam surrender his WMD and allow enforcement by international monitors. When asked what he would do if Saddam refused, Bush replied, "He'll find out."

Public statements about Iraq coincided with private instructions laying the groundwork for war. Within days of the Taliban's fall, Bush began accelerating plans to topple Saddam. In December 2001, he told General Tommy R. Franks that the Defense Department's Central Command (CENTCOM) should start preparing war plans for Iraq, to include lines of attack, specific targets for U.S. missiles and warplanes, and the composition of highly mechanized ground forces. From $100 to $200 million in additional funds was given to the CIA for covert operations. Clarke also asserted that the White House diverted $700 million from Afghanistan to pay for infrastructure that could be used for military operations in Iraq.

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